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Abstract. This article provides a critical realist take on comparative method-
ology. Heeding the call for greater attention to the ontological presupposi-
tions inherent in all methods, it ﬁ rst outlines comparative methods as they 
have traditionally been conceived and practised. Discerning two important 
aspects of these approaches – their notion of causality and their reliance on 
inductive inferences – the discussion moves on to consider their applica-
bility within a critical realist social science. Arguing that the  ontological 
presuppositions of traditional approaches to comparative methodology 
are not compatible with the ontology of critical realism, it seeks to specify 
some initial steps in the direction of designing a new approach securing 
this compatibility. Important to this new approach is theoretical, or abduc-
tive, comparison and the need to be context-sensitive.
Key words: causality, modes of inference (abduction, induction, retroduc-
tion), comparative method, context-sensitivity.
1. Introduction
In this article I discuss the merits of comparative case studies as they have been 
practised in qualitative social science and take some steps towards developing 
an alternative mode of comparison informed by critical realism. The question 
of method in critical realism has been raised by several authors, but their pre-
occupations and answers vary. Henry Wai-chung Yeung argues that ‘method 
in critical realism is underdeveloped and misunderstood, resulting in a meth-
odologically handicapped philosophy’.2 He is thus of the opinion that the time 
is ripe for a serious consideration of methodology in critical realist research. 
 1 Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1096 
Blindern, NO-0317 Oslo, Norway.
 2 Henry Wai-chung Yeung, ‘Critical realism and realist research in human geography: a 
method or a philosophy in search of a method?’, Progress in Human Geography 21(1) (1997), 56.
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Berth Danermark et al. argue that, if a consistent connection between ontol-
ogy and methodology is missing, then the employment of methods will be, if 
not wrong, then less fruitful.3 They are, however, very clear that they do not 
necessarily propose the development of a new method, but rather advocate 
the use of already existing methods within social science in a critical realist 
inspired practice. Furthermore, they propose methodological pluralism in the 
sense that diﬀ erent methods are appropriate to diﬀ erent situations. Still, review-
ing Danermark et al.’s Explaining Society, Andrew Sayer concludes: ‘The ques-
tion remains, however: what next for critical realist methodology?’4 One of the 
already existing methods in social science where the implications of a critical 
realist ontology and epistemology have yet to be duly considered is comparative 
case studies.5 All methods have ontological presuppositions, and enquiring into 
these helps us avoid any mismatch between methods employed and the nature 
of the object under study.6 Danermark et al. highlight comparison as a possi-
ble strategy for discerning structures and mechanisms, and Tony Lawson has 
sought to develop an explanatory method, involving comparison, appropriate 
to an open, structured and internally related reality.7 However, when employ-
ing comparative methods, questions of ontology, epistemology and notions of 
theory and causation arise. One methodological problem with comparative 
case studies relates to the assumption about the nature of the social world that 
informs them.8 The idea behind at least some comparative research is that the 
social world is structured in terms of regularities that can be expressed as laws. 
This is especially important if these laws are assumed to be deterministic. If 
this is the case, then a single negative instance can falsify the initial hypoth-
esis. I discuss the inﬂ uence of this idea on comparative case studies below. If, 
however, scientiﬁ c laws are, as in critical realism, treated in a more contingent 
or probabilistic manner, then the act of drawing theoretical conclusions from 
case studies becomes a much more complex matter. Another methodological 
problem concerns the procedure of abstracting from  particular cases instead 
of treating each case as a whole and bounded system. Central to my concern 
is to avoid inclining to empiricism, and thereby to a synchronic and correla-
 3 Berth Danermark et al., Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social Sciences [ES] (London: 
Routledge, 2002).
 4 Andrew Sayer, ‘Critical realist methodology: a view from Sweden’, Journal of Critical Real-
ism 1(1) (2002), 170.
 5 Peter Wad, ‘Komparation i kritisk realistisk perspektiv’, Dansk Sociologi 11(3) (2000) and 
‘Critical Realism and Comparative Sociology’ [CRCS], paper presented at the 5th IACR 
Conference, Roskilde, 2001.
 6 Tony Lawson, Reorienting Economics [RE] (London: Routledge, 2003).
 7 Danermark et al., ES; Lawson, RE.
 8 Martyn Hammersley et al., ‘Case study and theory’ [CST], in Case Study Method: Key Issues, 
Key Texts, eds R. Gomm et al. (London: Sage, 2000).
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tional concept of causality and the propensity to favour parsimoniousness at 
the expense of context.
I argue that comparative case studies have much to oﬀ er a critical realist 
researcher, but that the approach to them needs to be reworked to be consistent 
with the philosophy of critical realism. This involves both reﬂ ecting on what con-
clusions might be drawn from the application of comparative case studies, and 
revising the procedures for comparing. The article is structured into three sec-
tions. First, I scrutinise the Mill-inspired approaches to comparative case studies 
by looking at the notion of causality at their basis and the mode of inference they 
imply. The second section presents a general introduction to some of the canons 
of critical realism as a philosophy, paying particular attention to the critical real-
ist notion of causality and the preferred modes of inference. I also provide some 
arguments for why comparative case studies might provide a potential meth-
odological avenue for critical realism. In the third section I move on to taking 
some initial steps towards developing an approach to comparative case studies 
informed by and compatible with the philosophy of critical realism. Lastly, I pro-
vide an illustration of how this approach could be used in practice. 
2. Millean Approaches to Comparative Case Studies
The chief merit of comparative case studies is often said to be that it allows for an 
examination of patterns of similarities and diﬀ erences across a moderate number 
of cases, thus combining depth with a more extensive approach. I argue that com-
parative case studies often implicitly or explicitly draw on the canons of John 
Stuart Mill and his methods for examining these patterns. According to Charles 
Ragin, the objective of comparative studies is often to unravel the diﬀ erent 
causal conditions underlying diverse outcomes.9 This relates it directly to a wider 
debate on the notions of theory and causation. There are, according to Martyn 
Hammersley et al., at least two inﬂ uential interpretations of comparative methods 
implying diﬀ erent inductive inferences.10 I return to these interpretations after 
considering the notion of causality implicit in the Millean approaches.
2.1. Causation as regularity
Through the aspiration to identify the general causal conditions by examining 
patterns of similarities and diﬀ erences across cases, comparative case studies are 
 9 Charles C. Ragin, Constructing Social Research: The Unity and Diversity of Method [CSR] (Thou-
sand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1994).
 10 Hammersley et al., CST.
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often informed by what Lars Mjøset terms the law-oriented notion of theory.11 
Adopting this notion of theory implies regarding the social sciences as gener-
alising and hence relying on empirical studies seeking to establish regularities. 
Theory is here conceived as organised knowledge about observable patterns, 
and ‘comparison’, in this instance, means empirically comparing several factual 
cases. Within the empiricist tradition it is argued that nothing can be known 
to be real unless it is observable. Hume thus claimed that cause is merely con-
stant conjunction, and that there is no causality, that is, force or compulsion, in 
nature over and above invariant succession of events.12 This notion of causality 
is synchronic in that cause and eﬀ ect must be both adjacent and temporally suc-
cessive, and correlational in that the relation between them must be constant.13 
Taking Hume’s problem of induction as a point of departure, comparative 
studies often draw on the canons of Mill and his ‘method of agreement’ and 
‘method of diﬀ erence’. The ﬁ rst canon, informing the method of agreement, 
states: ‘If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have 
only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all instances 
agree, is the cause (or eﬀ ect) of the given phenomenon’.14 The canon behind 
the method of diﬀ erence is: 
If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an 
instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save 
one, that one occurring in the former; the circumstance in which alone the 
two instances diﬀ er, is the eﬀ ect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the 
cause, of the phenomenon.15
Mill maintained that the only way to theorise causal mechanisms is through 
comparison, with the method of agreement focusing on similarities among 
cases showing the same outcome, and the method of diﬀ erence on diﬀ erences 
between cases with diﬀ erent outcomes.16 For him, as for those adhering to a 
Humean notion of causality, causal relations did not involve any necessity, but 
were merely regularities to be discovered. Mill, in turn, was inspired by the 
thinking of Francis Bacon. Bacon, working on a rejection of the deductivism of 
 11 Lars Mjøset, ‘Theory: conceptions in the social sciences’, in The International Encyclopedia of 
the Social and Behavioral Sciences, eds Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Bates (Oxford: Elsevier, 2001).
 12 Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Andrew Abbott, Time Matters: On Theory and 
Method (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
 13 Abbott, ibid.
 14 John Stuart Mill, System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles 
of Evidence, and the Methods of Scientiﬁ c Investigation, 5th edn (London: Parker, Son, and Bourn, 
1843/1862), 428.
 15 Ibid., 429.
 16 Hammersley et al., CST.
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Aristotle, advanced a method relying on induction and giving greater force to 
the negative instance.17 He thus argued that all relevant cases must be laid out 
and checked for presence, absence and degrees with the aim to identify what 
is ‘always present or absent with the given nature, and always increases and 
decreases with it’.18 The key to comparative case studies is thus the selection of 
cases on the basis of diﬀ erences in outcome, and a focus on their similarities 
and what distinguishes them. 
Attempting to bridge the qualitative–quantitative divide, Ragin develops an 
approach called qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), which simultaneously 
combines many cases with many variables.19 As mentioned above, the approach 
is relatively context-sensitive, as he treats each case as a conﬁ guration, meaning 
that he pays heed to the complex of speciﬁ c features that make each case unique, 
although simpliﬁ cation and elimination are central to his method.20 In addition, 
the approach is open to multi-causality, as the analysis seeks to discover what 
caused a speciﬁ c eﬀ ect through conﬁ gurations of variables. However, although 
assuming that an eﬀ ect can have multiple causes, it is assumed that only one 
causal conﬁ guration can produce one eﬀ ect. The conﬁ gurations are plotted in 
matrices, and Ragin’s method operates with binary factors for description and 
explanation of the cases, or what he terms ‘presence–absence dichotomies’. This 
means that he assumes that a causal relation is either present or absent in each 
case. The procedure involves successively reducing the complexity of the con-
ﬁ gurations by eliminating variables not having any bearing on the outcome, and 
by, in the next stage, looking for ‘surplus terms’ employing algebra. Ragin’s rule 
bears close resemblance to Mill’s  canons: 
If two rows of a truth table diﬀ er on only one causal condition yet result in 
the same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the two rows 
can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler combi-
nation of causal conditions.21 
So even if the concept of conﬁ guration takes context into consideration, 
much information is lost during the research process. The approach is fur-
thermore inductivist and based on Mill’s canons, and is therefore a synchronic 
and correlational analysis lacking in explanatory depth. Additionally, Peter 
Wad raises a critique of Ragin’s notion of causality as deterministic, or at least 
 stochastic.22
 17  Ibid.
 18  Bacon, cited in Hammersley et al., CST, 242.
 19  Ragin, CSR.
 20  Ragin, CSR; Peter Wad, CRCS.
 21  Ragin, CSR, 125.
 22  Wad, ‘Komparation’.
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2.2. Inductive inferences 
According to Danermark et al., diﬀ erent modes of inference are foundational 
for how researchers develop, test and apply concepts and theories.23 Being asso-
ciated with case studies, comparative research is often tied to inductive infer-
ences. However, in what follows we shall see how diﬀ erent inductive procedures 
involve quite diﬀ erent philosophies.
First, comparative case studies might employ what Hammersley et al. term 
eliminative induction with a view to identifying necessary and suﬃ  cient causal 
mechanisms, as opposed to only the necessary ones, as usually induced in qual-
itative methods.24 The procedure often involves drawing up matrices checking 
for presence or absence of selected explanatory variables in order to eliminate 
variables not having any bearing on the outcome.25 This approach often draws 
explicitly on Mill’s above-mentioned methods. Identifying necessary condi-
tions for a given outcome involves examining cases with the same outcome 
and checking which variables they have in common. On the other hand, exam-
ining cases with diﬀ erences in outcome, and hence eliminating variables not 
aﬀ ecting the outcome, is necessary in order to arrive at the suﬃ  cient conditions 
for explaining the outcome.26 A main problem with this form of comparative 
method is, as already stated, that the elimination of false explanations is reliant 
on having included all the relevant features of the cases selected. And, accord-
ing to Hammersley et al., if features of cases are not simply evident to our 
senses, their identiﬁ cation involves a process of conceptualisation.27 The role of 
theory in selecting among potential explanatory factors cannot, in other words, 
be denied or simply neglected. Another problem is the number of cases needed 
if the study aspires to arrive at causal explanations on the basis of regulari-
ties, since this requires that every relevant case be studied. And, furthermore, 
since this includes all the cases occurring in the past, present and future, the 
number is inﬁ nite. The importance of a large number of cases is even clearer if 
the potential causal role of absences of particular events and combinations of 
features are taken into account. This is due to relying on abstracting by gener-
alising; that is, regularities across cases are presumed to be essential and thus 
abstracted because of this generality.28 Generalisation is here based on induc-
tion, and aspires to reach universally applicable conclusions from observations 
 23  Danermark et al., ES.
 24  Hammersley et al., CST.
 25  Ragin, CSR.
 26  Hammersley et al., CST.
 27  Ibid.
 28  Znaniecki, cited in J. Clyde Mitchell, ‘Case and situation analysis’, in Case Study Method: 
Key Issues, Key Texts, eds R. Gomm et al. (London: Sage, 2000).
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of a limited number of events or phenomena.29 Regularities are hence held to 
persist and are often treated as laws.30
The second mode of inference identiﬁ ed by Hammersley et al. is analytic 
induction as conceived by Florian Znaniecki.31 According to the latter, causa-
tion involves necessity, and causal analysis implies deﬁ ning the essential fea-
tures of what is to be explained. The aim of comparison here is to arrive at 
explanations by reﬁ ning and reformulating rather than to eliminate false ones. 
A critique of analytic induction is that it can only lead to the identiﬁ cation of 
necessary and not suﬃ  cient conditions, since the cases studied for the most 
part are ones where the phenomena to be explained are present. However, 
this is more a critique of the praxis than of the possibilities as there is noth-
ing about analytic induction that forecloses the inclusion of negative cases. 
In contrast to the abstraction by generalisation involved in eliminative induc-
tion, analytic induction seeks to generalise by abstracting characteristics of 
cases thought to be essential, presuming generality precisely because they are 
essential.32 The procedure does not develop a self-suﬃ  cient theory by analys-
ing one case thoroughly, but rather by examining a number of cases selected 
in order to illustrate formerly obscure elements of a general theory. Since one 
case is likely to manifest only some of the elements whose explication is needed 
in order to develop theory, an indeterminate number of strategically selected 
cases are necessary. 
3. Comparative Case Studies and Critical Realism
In this section I give a brief outline of the philosophy of critical realism and 
provide some arguments why comparative case studies might be an applicable 
and useful method. I argue that comparative case studies informed by critical 
realist philosophy will be abductive and retroductive, letting theory inform 
the selection of cases while using the collected data to reﬁ ne theoretical under-
standings. The realist ontology implies that reality exists relatively or absolutely 
independently of human consciousness of it, and epistemologically it entails 
that our knowledge of it is always fallible, although all knowledge is not equally 
fallible.33 Hence, contrary to the view among empiricists that reality is what is 
given in our experience of it, critical realists hold that reality must be given if 
researchers are able to investigate causal relations, but that our knowledge of 
 29  Danermark et al., ES.
 30  Lawson, RE.
 31  Hammersley et al., CST.
 32  Znaniecki, cited in Mitchell, ‘Case and situation’. 
 33  Yeung, ‘Critical realism and realist research’.
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it is socially produced.34 It follows from this that relativism is rejected, and by 
ascribing causal powers to human motives and social structures, critical realism 
has emancipation as an ultimate goal.35
3.1. Causality as immanent powers
Contrary to traditional realism, critical realism is based on an ontology that is 
deep, diﬀ erentiated and stratiﬁ ed.36 And contrary to empiricism, critical realism 
is based on an assumption of natural necessity.37 In addition to recognising that 
social event regularities are hard to come by, critical realists do not adhere to 
the view that causes are, and can be sought out by, such regularities. Rather, it 
is argued that regularities cannot oﬀ er any insights into anything but empirical 
regularities and statistical correlations. Consequently, regularities can, in open 
systems, at best be indicative of active mechanisms.38 Lawson has termed such 
imperfect event regularities ‘demi-regularities’ or ‘demi-regs’.39 The imperfect 
nature of regularities is due to the distinction between the three ontological 
domains: the empirical, the actual and the real.40 The empirical domain consists 
of our experiences, and the (demi-)regularities treated as causes in the approach 
outlined above are hence part of this domain. However, critical realists argue 
that what happens in the world is not equal to what is observed, thus the actual 
domain consists of events that happen regardless of our apprehension of them. 
The domain of the real consists of that which produces the events happening 
at the domain of the actual, that is, structures and mechanisms. An object is 
what it is by virtue of its properties, and it possesses causal powers by virtue 
of its structures. While there is an internal and necessary relation between the 
nature of an object and its causal powers, the relation between these causal 
powers and their eﬀ ect is external and contingent. Hence empirical data reﬂ ect 
only the tip of the iceberg.41 While structures have certain liabilities and pre-
dispositions, individual and contingent processes precipitate and determine 
actual outcomes. Rather than reducing what is to what we can know about it 
through observation, critical realists seek to ‘investigate and identify relation-
 34  Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy (London: 
Verso, 1989).
 35  Yeung, ‘Critical realism and realist research’.
 36  Wad, ‘Komparation’.
 37  Danermark et al., ES.
 38  Douglas V. Porpora, ‘Do realists run regressions?’ in After Postmodernism: An Introduction to 
Critical Realism, eds J. López and G. Potter (London: Continuum, 2001).
 39  Lawson, RE.
 40  Danermark et al., ES.
 41  Wad, ‘Komparation’.
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ships and non-relationships, respectively, between what we experience, what 
actually happens, and the underlying mechanisms that produce the events in 
the world’.42 The structures and mechanisms are thus real and distinct from the 
patterns of events they generate, and, in turn, our experience of the events.43 In 
other words, mechanisms do not act actualistically, that is, they do not result 
in the same actual events or outcomes, but transfactually, meaning that they 
are always in play regardless of the outcome.44 Critical realism will thus guard 
against treating actualities, or events, as being the sole constituents of the world, 
and against expecting particular conjunctions of events necessarily to be recur-
rent. Explanation involves a movement from observed phenomena at one level 
to their underlying causes at another, and deeper, level, and is possible with-
out any stable event regularities being uncovered.45 Using the example of the 
spurious connection between the presence of storks and the number of babies, 
Danermark et al. argue that analyses of empirical regularities may get mixed 
with the discovery of causes.46 They do not, however, deny the merit of statis-
tical investigations, but contend that they must be applied according to their 
capabilities. Informing about causes is not among these. From a critical real-
ist perspective, causes are not regularities but powers and liabilities, and they 
‘may be possessed unexercised, exercised unrealised, and realised unperceived 
(or undetected) by men; they may also be transformed’.47 Hence critical realists 
understand causality as a generative and contextual concept.48 An explanation 
thus requires that the generative mechanisms be studied in their context, mean-
ing that external eﬀ ects of mechanisms other than the ones internal to the object 
of study must be taken into account. Contextual aspects are thus important for 
explaining the eﬀ ects, but not for theorising the potential causal powers, of an 
object.49 However, seeking contextless relations among variables, as positivists 
do, makes little sense.50 Critical realists, in line with Ragin’s QCA, advocate 
multi-causality but, being less deterministic, apply it in both directions.51 Hence 
a particular mechanism might produce completely diﬀ erent outcomes in time 
and space, and a particular event can be caused by diﬀ erent mechanisms and 
itself in turn constitute a mechanism. The atomism of Hume, where cause and 
 42  Danermark et al., ES, 21.
 43  Roy Bhaskar, ‘Philosophy and scientiﬁ c realism’, in Critical Realism: Essential Readings, eds 
Margaret Archer et al. (London: Routledge, 1998).
 44  Lawson, RE.
 45  Ibid.
 46  Danermark et al., ES.
 47  Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Hassocks: Harvester, 1978), 18.
 48  Wad, ‘Komparation’.
 49  Wad, CRCS.
 50  Porpora, ‘Do realists run regressions?’.
 51  Ragin, CSR.
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eﬀ ect were seen as separate and independent, is in other words replaced by a 
view of causality as powers possessed by agents or objects and not as relations 
among separate categories of phenomena. Causality is furthermore conceived 
of as a process, and thus diachronic, and, as opposed to static abstractions, 
captures the dynamic dimension of reality.52 
The critical realist notion of causality thus implies that we cannot look for 
universal laws in empirical data, and causality cannot be congruent with pre-
diction.53 Starting from another conception of causality, comparative methods 
need not be about arriving at invariant associations. If atomism is denied and 
the possibility of gaining insight into causal relations by examining one single 
case is maintained, comparative method becomes a way of studying contin-
gency and broadening the base from which to develop theory. More impor-
tantly perhaps, another consequence is that causal powers may be possessed 
by objects or relations even though they are not exercised. Hence regulari-
ties will not necessarily tell us anything about causality, although they might; 
that is, objects and relations have causal powers independently of any speciﬁ c 
pattern of events apprehended by our senses.54 In other words, rather than 
being preoccupied with regularities between distinct objects and events, or 
cause and eﬀ ect, critical realists deal with what objects or relations are and 
the things they can do in virtue of their nature. According to Paul Connolly, 
a primary goal becomes to study which and how causal relationships operate 
in the case(s) chosen, and not to test whether these relationships are present 
elsewhere.55 However, he argues that analyses must draw on accounts of causal 
relationships in other cases and contexts. Nonetheless, studying causal pow-
ers requires in-depth knowledge, and the approach is accordingly much more 
intensive than one based on the canons of Mill. The aim is not to examine reg-
ularities across all cases, or at least as many as possible, but to gain knowledge 
about causal relationships through in-depth analysis of a few selectively chosen 
cases. Comparison is needed to strengthen validity, as it is the general nature 
of causal claims that allows people to check what caused what in a given situ-
ation.56 Hence, explanations rely on general assumptions about causality that 
cannot be validated by a study based on a single case.
 52  Danermark et al., ES.
 53  Wad, CRCS.
 54  Danermark et al., ES.
 55  Referred to in Hammersley et al., CST.
 56  Ibid.
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3.2. Retroductive and abductive inferences
According to Danermark et al., studies aiming at describing or theorising fun-
damental conditions may to great advantage be organised as comparative case 
studies.57 Cases are not selected primarily on the basis of diﬀ erences in outcome, 
but rather because the cases manifest a common structure that the researcher 
wants to describe. For a comparison to be relevant, however, the cases should 
be very diﬀ erent in most other aspects. By working comparatively, as opposed 
to undertaking a single case study, it becomes possible to a greater extent to 
distinguish necessary conditions from contingent ones.58 Another reason why 
comparative case studies are favoured in the critical realist tradition is that they 
provide an empirical foundation for retroduction. Since qualities and structures 
are often hard to discern in concrete cases, systematic comparison might help 
the researcher both identify them and distinguish between diﬀ erent forms they 
might assume. Generalisation is here arrived at, as opposed to the extrapola-
tion referred to above, by means of retroductive inference, and thus moving 
not from the particular to the universal, but from the concrete to the abstract. 
Hence, while deduction and induction restrict the researcher to merely consid-
ering the level of reality at which the given phenomenon occurs, retroduction 
allows a movement beyond the surface phenomenon.59 In addition to retro-
duction, critical realists often employ abductive inference. While retroduction 
infers by answering the question ‘What made this possible?’, abduction is used 
to identify structures when analysing empirical data. Abduction is often con-
ceived as a dialectical movement between empirical data and theory, as, in 
seeking to explain an empirical event, this event is related to theory that in 
turn leads the researcher to new interpretation of the event. What distinguishes 
abduction from analytical induction is that in induction the starting-point is the 
empirical data, and the conclusion is a generalisation, while abduction starts 
from a general theory or interpretation and thus recontextualises the theory 
by applying it to a new context, or reinterprets a phenomenon in light of a 
new theoretical framework.60 It is explicitly recognised that the theory chosen 
is one out of  several possible theories, the aim of the procedure being to pro-
vide new insight as a result of employing an alternative theory to that which is 
hegemonic. However, this makes it a fallible insight, and theory assumes more 
the role of a working hypothesis as conceived by Lee J. Cronbach.61 In stud-
 57  Danermark et al., ES.
 58  Ibid.
 59  Lawson, RE.
 60  Danermark et al., ES.
 61  Yvonna S. Lincoln and Egon G. Guba, ‘The only generalisation is: there is no generali-
sation’, in Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts, eds R. Gomm et al. (London: Sage, 2000).
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ies guided by abduction the dialectic between theoretical reinterpretation of 
cases or recontextualisation of theories, on the one hand, and theory reﬁ nement 
based on case studies, on the other, is absolutely central.62 In order to be bet-
ter able to distinguish between internal relations and contingent circumstances 
when employing retroduction, comparing several cases is an important strategy. 
However, analysing the interplay of multiple mechanisms in an open world, 
critical realists seem to favour intensive research designs.63
A problem with comparative case studies might be that knowing what to 
look for requires quite extensive knowledge of the mechanisms involved in 
advance. Without this knowledge, important explanatory factors might be 
overlooked, thus impacting negatively on the validity of the research ﬁ ndings. 
Theory thus assumes an important role in working out the research strategy 
prior to the collection of data. It is possible to argue that extensive knowl-
edge prior to data collection might create biases. However, the neutrality and 
objectivity of any kind of social research has been questioned, and the need 
for researchers to reﬂ ect on their role and position in the project is acknowl-
edged.64 According to Danermark et al., every attempt, including scientiﬁ c, to 
understand the world starts from our concepts of it.65 In critical realism the 
relation between the real world and the concepts we form of it has become a 
major focus. Hence, reality exists independently of our apprehension of it, but 
our experience of it is conceptually mediated. Scientiﬁ c understandings of this 
reality are in other words theory-laden, but not theory-dependent. 
4. Towards a Critical Realist Comparative Methodology
To me, the procedure based on the canons of Mill appears too rigorous and does 
not allow for contingent mechanisms and synergy between the variables, and I 
think it implies an oversimpliﬁ cation of reality. The search for regularities and 
the aspiration to prediction also implies an inclination to social  determinism 
that is incompatible with studying societies in which human beings are capable 
of exercising free will.66 If an agent is free and able to choose to do other than 
some given y in speciﬁ c conditions x, searching for patterns across a wide range 
of cases becomes fraught with diﬃ  culty.67 Critical realists such as Margaret 
 62  Danermark et al., ES.
 63  Porpora, ‘Do realists run regressions?’.
 64  Mats Alvesson and Kaj Sköldberg, Tolkning och reﬂ ektion: vetenskapsﬁ losoﬁ  och kvalitativ metod 
(Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1994).
 65  Danermark et al., ES.
 66  Hammersley et al., CST.
 67  Lawson, RE.
© Equinox Publishing Ltd 2007
17TOWARDS A CRITICAL REALIST COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY
Archer have argued that in the social sphere there are properties and powers 
particular to people, for instance, reﬂ exivity and creativity in relation to the con-
text, which preclude any experimental closure.68 A merit of rigorous approaches 
is that they are systematic and orderly, but this is at the expense of studying the 
context. I try to avoid the disadvantages recognised above by favouring con-
text and nuances over a systematic approach, thus allowing for contingencies. 
Instead of the eliminative induction based on more than 15 cases exempliﬁ ed 
in Ragin’s QCA, I agree with Hammersley et al.’s redirection towards analytic 
induction based on fewer cases.69 The justiﬁ cation of this reduction in number 
of cases is grounded in the notion of causality applied. Despite an increased 
number of cases, comparative case studies do not oﬀ er a greater opportunity 
for making generalisations in the statistical sense of the term anyway. First of 
all, the number of cases is far too low, and, secondly, the cases are not selected 
randomly. I turn now to how critical realism might form the backbone of an 
alternative approach to comparative case studies. According to Wad, however, 
such an approach is yet to be formulated, so my aim is to provide only some 
initial steps.70
Before embarking on that task, however, a brief consideration of Lawson’s 
contrast explanation is warranted, as this provides very valuable insights into 
how the operation of generative mechanisms could be identiﬁ ed through com-
parison.71 Lawson takes as a point of departure the fact that people are quite 
successful every day in negotiating the complex social world, and he asks how 
knowledge of the world is advanced. The answer he provides is that people 
often question why something is not quite as expected, and that such surprised 
expectations are everyday occurrences. He holds, furthermore, that this has 
signiﬁ cant import for social scientiﬁ c research through contrast explanation. 
Contrast explanation seeks to answer the question ‘Why x rather than y in con-
ditions where y was expected?’, and the explanation oﬀ ered is not of x per se, 
but of the contrast ‘x rather than y’. The focus is thus not primarily on the out-
come, but on comparing or contrasting the cases where x and y have occurred 
respectively. There are, according to Lawson, two necessary conditions for suc-
cessful contrast explanation. First, there must be a domain over which compar-
ison is meaningful and, secondly, all relevant aspects, except the one making 
the cases diﬀ erent, must be correctly assessed to be subject to more or less the 
same set of causal inﬂ uence. Contrast explanation can be used in initiating an 
 68  Margaret Archer, ‘Introduction: realism in the social sciences’, in Critical Realism: Essential 
Readings, eds Margaret Archer et al. (London: Routledge, 1998).
 69  Ragin, CSR; Hammersley et al., CST.
 70  Wad, ‘Komparation’.
 71  Lawson, RE.
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explanatory process by focusing on surprise, but also in directing the explana-
tory process by explaining the discrepancy between outcomes. By directing the 
attention to the (set of) mechanism(s) explaining diverging outcomes, contrast 
explanation draws heavily on Mill’s method of diﬀ erence: ‘By attempting to 
explain … the observed contrast … factors common to all … can be stand-
ardised for, or factored out, allowing the possibility of identifying the (spe-
ciﬁ c or most direct) cause’.72 Lawson does acknowledge this inspiration in one 
of his endnotes, and renders, in this sense, contrast explanation Millean. In 
discriminating between competing causal hypotheses, the researcher is again 
advised to seek out contrasts on which these hypotheses bear, that is, perform a 
more or less predictive test of their empirical adequacy. Hence Lawson invokes 
deductive logic when he proposes a way of ‘testing’ hypotheses: 
In the case of each hypothesis in contention, inferences are drawn concerning 
contrasts that we might expect to ﬁ nd. In each case it is inferred that if the 
hypothesis is correct, [the outcome will be more prevalent] in the region of 
the contrast space closest to the hypothesised mechanism in question.73
It seems to me that instead of shifting the focus away from regularities after 
acknowledging that they are rare in the social world, Lawson’s approach seeks 
to adjust experimental activities to make them ﬁ t the social sciences and hence 
uphold the central status of (demi-)regularities. Acknowledging that social 
reality is open and that social events will rarely be clear-cut, it is my opinion 
that instead of opting for a simplifying and systematic approach, the complex 
nature of the social world ought to be reﬂ ected in a complex methodology. 
On the other hand, Lawson does not stylise the identiﬁ ed demi-regs, nor uti-
lise them solely for prediction, but he rather regards them as ‘a moment in the 
causal process which goes beyond them’.74 Demi-regs are important in form-
ing our expectations and are seen to provide an indication of the working of 
a causal mechanism; they are also instrumental, as seen above, in directing 
scientiﬁ c investigations. I agree with Lawson that a surprised expectation, or 
contrast, might be a good point of departure for awakening our analytical 
senses, and that regularities might be indicative of active mechanisms, but in 
my  opinion the imperfection of regularities in the social world ought to make 
researchers wary of stretching what they can oﬀ er. Hence, I argue that, in addi-
tion to letting surprised expectations of external diﬀ erences among cases ini-
tiate an explanatory process, researchers need to conduct an internal analysis 
of each case. Instead of standardising for, or factoring out, factors common 
to all cases, internal analysis might reveal how the common factors manifest 
 72  Ibid., 95.
 73  Ibid., 97.
 74  Ibid., 102.
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 themselves diﬀ erently in diﬀ erent contexts. For example, a factor common 
to trade unions in Europe is that they regard themselves to varying degrees 
as ‘social partners’ with government and capital. However, the consequences 
of this ideology in a particular industrial dispute may play out diﬀ erently in 
each case depending on several contextual and contingent factors such as the 
outlook and militancy of both the workers involved and the particular union 
oﬃ  cial(s). ‘Social partnership’ can, in other words, be an interesting similar-
ity between German trade unions being involved in concessionary bargaining 
and Irish trade unions having members barricaded in a ship’s engine room for 
three weeks, and should not be standardised for or factored out, as an analysis 
of it might enhance our understanding of the ideology of social partnership 
and how it can function both as a cause and a mediator of events. Another 
example where internal analysis would be important is in explaining the con-
trast in economic achievement between East and Southeast Asia, on the one 
hand, and Africa, on the other. This presupposes that the contrast spaces have 
a similar causal history. Although this presupposition is not unusual in the 
ﬁ eld of development theory, writers such as Philip Kelly have demonstrated 
the contrary; there is an enormous diversity of development experiences even 
among the countries of Southeast Asia.75 Any explanation of the contrast to 
Africa should thus be supplemented by an internal analysis of each case, that 
is, each of the countries of East and Southeast Asia and of Africa, and their 
diﬀ erences need not be contrasts. I now turn to the task of further developing 
a critical realist approach to comparative method, one not incompatible with 
Lawson’s, but supplemented with a more contextual scrutiny of each case.
4.1. Theoretical and abductive comparison
Danermark et al. argue that it is restricting to think of method as having pri-
marily to do with data collection and empirical analysis, since an essential part 
of it is employing and developing theories.76 According to Victoria Bonnell, 
it is essential to consider, not only the type of theories employed, but also the 
function they perform.77 This relates both to the relation between theory and 
empirical data and to the form of comparison. Bonnell diﬀ erentiates between 
two forms of comparison, which she terms ‘analytical’ and ‘illustrative’, relying 
 75  Philip F. Kelly, ‘Spaces of labour control: comparative perspectives from Southeast 
Asia’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 27(4) (2002), 395–411, doi:10.1111/1475-
5661.00062.
 76  Danermark et al., ES.
 77  Victoria E. Bonnell, ‘The uses of theory, concepts and comparison in historical sociol-
ogy’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 22(2) (1980), 156–73.
© Equinox Publishing Ltd 2007
20 ANN CECILIE BERGENE
on two diﬀ erent meanings of ‘comparison’. The former is based on compari-
son between or among cases, and is used in explanations of patterns of simi-
larity and diﬀ erence by inductively discerning regularities, as, for instance, in 
Ragin’s approach.78 In illustrative, or theoretical, comparison, on the other 
hand, the researcher compares several cases as they relate to one or more theo-
ries applicable to all of them in order to identify and clarify the function of 
constituent elements, that is, analysing in terms of substantial and contextual 
relations.79 This approach is thus not inductive and can, as we shall see, sit well 
with abductive inferences, and it implies a two-pronged conceptualisation of 
‘comparison’ involving both comparing theory as it relates to each case and 
comparing across the factual cases in light of the theory. Here it is important 
to reiterate the distinction between critical realism and empiricism, as theory in 
the ﬁ rst instance is not associated with generality in the sense of repeated series 
of events, but with structures. Furthermore, by employing abductive and retro-
ductive inferences, already existing theories are seen as a resource rather than 
a bias- creating impediment to induction. Operating with a partly non-observ-
able reality, theories may help us gain knowledge of structures and mechanisms, 
which can hardly be attained through induction. General theories should thus 
be used to formulate interesting and relevant questions in concrete studies 
paying heed to speciﬁ c contextual circumstances. Abduction entails reinter-
pretation and recontextualisation, as researchers take their starting-point in 
a theoretical framework and thereby interpret and assign new meaning to the 
phenomenon under study or develop theory by applying it in new contexts. 
Classifying without being guided by theory might, according to Danermark et 
al., run the risk of being short-sighted, narrow, naïve and without critical poten-
tial.80 Reinterpretation of empirical data should, in other words, aim at chal-
lenging common-sense  categorisations and explanations. There are two ways 
of comparing when taking theories as the point of departure; comparing the 
explanatory power of diﬀ erent theories on the same empirical data, or applying 
theories across several  empirical ﬁ elds. The latter is closest to the traditional 
comparative case study, and seeks to assess the explanatory power of a theory, 
being applicable to one case, when applied to additional cases.81 Both entail an 
evaluation of theories with reference to their merits as interpretative frameworks 
and not through empirical veriﬁ cation/falsiﬁ cation. Cases are chosen selectively 
and are assumed to manifest the structure that the theory describes, although 
they should be diﬀ erent in other respects. This procedure could contribute to 
 78  Ragin, CSR.
 79  Bonnell, ‘The uses of theory’.
 80  Danermark et al., ES.
 81  Bonnell, ‘The uses of theory’.
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increased  knowledge of the workings of a structure while also providing a foun-
dation for sorting out contingent and accidental circumstances.82
4.2. Context-sensitivity
According to Danermark et al., the phenomena studied by social scientists are 
contextually deﬁ ned, and to be able to explain, researchers need to study how 
mechanisms are manifested in concrete contexts.83 In order to gain knowledge 
of both a general and a contextual kind, the combination of intensive and exten-
sive research designs is proposed. Extending this to comparative case studies, 
the analytical and the illustrative forms of comparison need not be regarded as 
mutually exclusive.84 Thomas Janoski and Alexander Hicks propose a strategy 
of supplementing an external comparative analysis among cases with an inter-
nal examination of each case, and this can be related to the distinction between 
analytical and illustrative forms.85 While the external analysis identiﬁ es similari-
ties and diﬀ erences among the cases, the internal analysis is conducted in order 
to gain explanatory depth. However, since emphasis can be placed on one or 
the other, it is important to stress that in order to term the approach ‘theoreti-
cal comparison’, the external comparison of similarities and diﬀ erences ought 
only to be preliminary, although important in the selection of cases. The depth 
attained by internal analysis of each case, coupled with the scope achieved 
through external comparison, becomes particularly important when the inter-
action between, and maybe even the interdependence of, the cases in question 
is acknowledged. If, for example, a researcher is to analyse the relative strength 
of trade unions organising in diﬀ erent industrial sectors by looking at the out-
comes of several actions, any outcome could be the result of that trade union’s 
eﬀ orts and leverage, but also of assistance from, or even cooperation with, oth-
ers. In order to determine what is the case, the external analysis of similarities 
and diﬀ erences in achievements should be supplemented by an internal analysis 
engaging the particular unfolding of events. 
The procedure Janoski and Hicks propose consists ﬁ rst of formulating a 
research problem and ﬁ nding a theoretical perspective, and is hence not a 
purely inductive approach, although Wad contends that their methodological 
 82  Danermark et al., ES.
 83  Ibid.
 84  Bonnell, ‘The uses of theory’.
 85  Thomas Janoski and Alexander M. Hicks, ‘Methodological innovations in comparative 
political economy: an introduction’, in The Comparative Political Economy of the Welfare State, eds 
Janoski and Hicks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
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backbone is Millean.86 Already established theories are, as in critical realism, 
not regarded as impediments and biases, but rather as a resource. The mode 
of inference is, as already mentioned, abduction, although Janoski and Hicks 
seem to regard it as a procedure to avoid biases. However, the critical real-
ist notion of abduction where, unlike induction, the researcher starts from a 
theory and, unlike deduction, does not arrive at a conclusion that is logically 
given in the premises, would be applicable to their procedure.87 The aim is 
moving from one conception of something to a new, and hopefully more devel-
oped, conception of it. Danermark et al. term this a ‘recontextualisation’ since 
it entails interpreting and explaining a phenomenon within the framework of 
a new set of ideas or a new context, but I prefer the term ‘reinterpretation’ for 
the act of employing a new set of theories on already known phenomena.88 The 
next step involves selecting cases, and this is not done randomly but, on the 
contrary, selectively on the basis of a belief that they exhibit the operation of 
the structures and mechanisms delineated by the theoretical perspective cho-
sen as the framework. In other words, instead of trying to develop a theory 
inductively, the researcher ought to examine cases that are consciously selected 
in order to illuminate and further develop formerly obscure or undertheorised 
aspects of the general theoretical framework.89 During and after the selection 
of cases a preliminary external comparative analysis of their similarities and 
dissimilarities is conducted. However, when this is done the researcher sup-
plements the comparisons of characteristics between cases with data collec-
tion and internal analyses of each case in its own right, paying heed to context 
and laying the groundwork for the theoretical comparison. Hence, in addition 
to the theories needed to explain internal dynamics, each case is compared 
in relation to the theoretical framework. By applying the theories to diﬀ er-
ent contexts, the researcher is, in that process, forced to adapt them to each 
speciﬁ c case, but with a view to discerning, in the end, the general as distinct 
from the contingent. In other words, a general theory might be applicable to 
several cases, but the mechanisms it depicts may play out diﬀ erently in diﬀ er-
ent contexts. This was seen in the example provided above, where theories of 
class compromise and social partnership would be applicable to analyses of 
both German and of Irish trade unionism, but where analyses of concrete trade 
union practice reveal how its manifestation may vary. The internal analysis is 
thus an iterative process, although the researcher is simultaneously  cognizant 
 86  Ibid.; Wad, CRCS.
 87  Danermark et al., ES.
 88  Ibid.
 89  Mitchell, ‘Case and situation’.
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of the internal analyses undertaken in the other cases.90 Adapting the gen-
eral theory to speciﬁ c circumstances and comparing them might, in the next 
instance, reﬁ ne the theory in its general aspects. The last step consists of ana-
lysing the interconnections between, on the one hand, the (dis)similarities 
among cases identiﬁ ed in the external analysis and, on the other, the opera-
tion of structures and mechanisms in each case found in the internal analysis, 
with a view to reformulating the theoretical framework outlined at the very 
start. Again, this is compatible with abduction since it entails a ﬂ exible inter-
action between conceptualisation and analysis, and in research practice guided 
by abduction ‘the interplay (dialectic) between theoretical redescriptions of 
cases and case-study-based theory development is absolutely central’.91 Theory 
is thus not regarded as a ready-made product, but rather as a certain way of 
viewing reality informing the questions asked and the interpretation of data in 
concrete research. While the preliminary external analysis identiﬁ es the simi-
larities and diﬀ erences between the cases and is driven by a theoretical inter-
est in explaining them, the internal analysis employs theory by interpreting 
each case, and thereby provides the basis for the next round of comparison. By 
employing the same theoretical framework across cases, new light will be shed 
both on the theories and on the cases, and the theories will provide an order-
ing framework helping the researcher to know what to look for in the internal 
analysis. Observable empirical regularities can thus be used as a starting-point 
in the selection of theoretically interesting cases and in an attempt to discern 
properties of the object by studying it in its context. The context cannot be 
regarded as an unwanted nuance to be eliminated, as it conditions whether and 
how causal powers are actualised. 
Through comparative case studies a researcher might achieve a reinter-
pretation by placing the phenomena in a new interpretative framework, but 
also a recontextualisation by comparing the diﬀ erent cases. In the process, 
the researcher might discover new aspects of the cases selected, resulting in a 
broadened imagination spawning ideas as to how each case can be interpreted. 
By comparing diﬀ erent cases, the aim is to shed light on common abstract 
processes that, at ﬁ rst sight, might not appear to be empirical similarities. For 
instance, by comparing the plight of trade unions striving to organise in a gar-
ment factory in an Export Processing Zone (EPZ) in Namibia with the chal-
lenges an Irish trade union meets in unionising workers on board ships, a 
researcher can come to see how the diﬀ erent contexts of EPZs and ships might 
manifest similar structural constraints on trade unions.
 90  Janoski and Hicks, ‘Methodological’.
 91  Danermark et al., ES, 95.
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The two types of theoretical comparison, that is, comparing diﬀ erent theo-
ries on one case and, on the other hand, a set of theories across many cases, 
can be combined when further developing Janoski and Hick’s procedure. The 
framework of interpretation employed in the internal analysis constitutes one 
out of several possible ones, and in the analysis the theories are compared 
to ﬁ nd out which provides new insight and has the most explanatory power. 
Externally the set of theories act as a common framework for interpretation, 
and is thus applied to all cases.
5. An Illustration
In order to illustrate how the proposed methodology could be practised, I 
now provide an example from my own research. My point of departure being 
to further develop theories on global trade unionism, I was at ﬁ rst inspired by 
the contrasts in achievement among the Global Union Federations (GUFs). 
In conducting the preliminary external analysis, I selected the three cases 
that were most contrastive and that varied in theoretically interesting prop-
erties: the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers’ Federation; 
the International Metal Workers’ Federation; and the International Transport 
Workers’ Federation. I then collected more data on their properties and achieve-
ments with a view to comparing and, subsequently, explaining the similarities 
and diﬀ erences so identiﬁ ed. However, in order to identify structures and gen-
erative mechanisms, I found it necessary to supplement this external analysis 
with an internal analysis of the three GUFs in their own right, employing the 
same theoretical framework for each of them, and thereby undertaking a theo-
retical comparison. By so doing, I was able to see to what extent the context 
and contingent factors mediated the operation of the mechanisms identiﬁ ed 
through theory in each case. Not regarding cases as hermetically sealed sys-
tems, it becomes important to compare both the common inﬂ uences of the 
larger context of which they all are part, for instance global capitalism, and 
how the cases interact, for example, how a successful achievement on part of 
one GUF might inspire others to follow suit. In my view this necessitates an 
internal analysis. From the perspective of human geography it is also important 
to break the cases down into geographical scales delineating the structures and 
mechanisms both common to all and particular to each of them. For instance, 
the ideology of social partnership will in varying degrees be manifested at the 
global, national and local scale. In other words, instead of increasing the exten-
siveness of the comparative case study by analysing six cases externally, further 
understanding was sought by increasing the intensiveness by investigating three 
concrete sub-cases within each case as part of the internal analysis. These were 
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empirical events in which one of the three GUFs was involved, and each sub-
case was analysed employing the same theoretical framework, although theories 
necessary to explain the event were added. The last step consists of conjoin-
ing the insights gained through the preceding external and internal analyses 
with a view to providing new insight and reﬁ ning the existing theories. This is 
not done by describing or comparing the empirical traits of each case, but by 
comparing how the structures were manifested and how the mechanisms oper-
ated in the diﬀ erent cases. The dis(similarities) found in the external analysis 
are explained by this reﬁ ned theoretical framework, while the contextual and 
empirical diﬀ erences found in the internal analyses could account for diﬀ erent 
manifestations. This last step thus involves an abductive comparison with a 
dialectical move between theory and data across cases with a view to abstract-
ing the internal and necessary relations. In other words, while the two preced-
ing steps were analyses of concrete phenomena, the last step is more concerned 
with abstract conceptualisation. 
6. Conclusion
While Lawson’s contrast explanation might lead the initial stages of research 
as well as guide the external analysis, I have argued that it needs to be sup-
plemented by the internal analysis of each case. Furthermore, theoretical com-
parison employing abductive and retroductive inferences allows researchers 
to draw inspiration from the formal procedures of comparative case studies, 
while not reducing their ﬁ ndings to variables in a matrix, but instead remain-
ing open to the complexity of causal relations and the society as an open sys-
tem. It will thus support a more interpretative, contextual approach based on 
a limited number of cases, and hence move an internal analysis away from a 
preliminary or background status to an analysis in its own right. It is further-
more important to diﬀ erentiate between comparative case studies striving to 
explain through induction, and seeking to arrive at some kind of formula dis-
playing necessary and suﬃ  cient conditions, on the one hand, and comparative 
case studies concerned with developing theories, on the other.92 This distinc-
tion is especially important when choosing an approach, since in attempts to 
develop theory, cases are interesting just to the extent to which they exemplify 
the relevant theoretical category. On the other hand, if aiming at more inductive 
theory generation, within a critical realist perspective much more heed needs to 
be paid to the distinctive features of the diﬀ erent cases. The selection of cases 
is not undertaken with a view to including all relevant cases in order to ensure 
 92  Hammersley et al., CST.
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some degree of certainty of the inductive inferences, but rather with a view to 
ﬁ nding cases that have signiﬁ cant implications for theory. Furthermore, the law-
like statements of necessary and suﬃ  cient conditions must be substituted for 
a focus on generative mechanisms, the outcome of which cannot be explained 
without due consideration of the context in which they operate and thus the 
contingency, as opposed to determinism, of their eﬀ ect. Important principles 
in comparative case studies guided by critical realism are thus context-sensitiv-
ity due to contingency, and hence that induction, or basing research purely on 
empirical data, cannot lead to a deeper understanding of social reality. 
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